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Extralegal Property, Legal Monism,
and Pluralism
Daniel Bonilla Maldonado*
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal monism-that is, the idea that there must be one and
only one centralized hierarchical legal system in each state-has
dominated the political and legal imagination of the West.1 There
must be, argue the monists, one sole legal order at the state level
in order to protect the principles of equality, legal security, legal-
ity, and political unity, as well as to maintain social and political
order. Legal norms must have a general character: citizens must
know the legal consequences of their actions and must be certain
that the same rules and principles will be applied in similar fash-
ion to all the members of the political community. The monists
argue that violence and uncertainty arise when there are parallel
legal orders that simultaneously seek to control the conduct of citi-
zens by differing means.
Property in the West has conceptually depended on legal
monism.2 Our political and legal imagination, influenced by the
* Professor at the Universidad de los Andes in BogotA, Colombia.
1. This article is product of a research project done during several months by a
team consisting of Everaldo Lamprea, Francisco Quiroz, Laura Rico, Nicolds Figueroa
and myself. The arguments presented in this text were nourished by the discussions
that we had during the months in which the research team met weekly to talk about
the project's advancements. The ideas presented were also nourished by the debates
that we had in the seminar about legal pluralism that I taught at Universidad de los
Andes. All members of the research team participated in this seminar. Similarly, this
article is rooted in and overlaps with the various texts that were created as a
consequence of the collective work: on the one hand, the undergraduate theses
written by Laura Rico and Nicolds Figueroa, that I had the opportunity to supervise;
on the other hand, the text, La Propiedad Extralegal: Un Caso de Pluralismo
Juridico, written by Everaldo Lamprea (unpublished). A draft of this article was
presented at SELA 2008 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. I thank the seminar
participants for their critiques and comments.
2. See generally Masaji Chiba, Legal Pluralism in mind: A Non Western View, in
LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY: CONSEQUENCES OF PLURALISM IN LAW 71 (Hanne Petersen &
Henrik Zahle eds., 1989); Peter Fitzpatrick, Law, Plurality and Underdevelopment, in
LEGALITY, IDEOLOGY AND THE STATE 159 (David Sugarman ed., 1983); Tamar Diana
Wilson, Introduction, in 25 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 3 (1998); Nicholas
Blomley, The Boundaries of Property: Lessons from Beatrix Potter, 48 CANADIAN
GEOGRAPHER 91 (2004); John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. OF LEGAL
PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1986); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. &
Soc'y REV. 869 (1998); Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal
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political and legal philosophies of Locke and Kelsen, is committed
to the idea that the absence of a centralized hierarchical legal sys-
tem at the state level would generate cognitive and security
problems of such magnitude that private property would subse-
quently weaken and disappear. The existence of several legal
orders whose objective is the regulation of property within the
same State would make the exchange of goods and services very
difficult. The citizens and public officials would not know which
rules should be applied in cases of conflicts regarding property.
Real rights would become subjective inasmuch that they would
depend on the different normative references available. The cir-
cumstances in which the coercive power of the State should be
employed would be unclear.
In this paper, I will argue that legal monism regarding prop-
erty is a faulty theory from a descriptive perspective and that it is
a limited theory from a normative perspective. On the one hand,
the way it conceives of property does not permit an accurate
description of how property rights are actually imagined and prac-
ticed in a good part of the global South. The conceptual axes of
legal monism cannot account for the diversity of property regimes
that exist in a high number of developing countries. It is esti-
mated that approximately 50% of the population in the global
South lives in peripheral districts where property is controlled by
norms other than those of the State's legal order.' Neither does
the theory permit the description and comprehension of the pro-
cess by which unofficial judicial systems are created,4 the expo-
sure of the complex relationships that these systems maintain
Pluralism, 13 CARDoZo L. REV. 1443 (1992); Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The
Global Interplay of Legal and Social Systems, 45 Am. J. COMP. L. 149 (1997). See also
the texts that were written as a consequence of the collective research work: Everaldo
Lamprea, La Propiedad Extralegal: Un Caso de Pluralismo Juridico (unpublished
thesis, Universidad de los Andes) (on file with author); Laura Rico Gutinrrez de
Pifieres, Pluralismo y Propiedad Informal: Un Ejemplo del Caso Bogotano
(unpublished masters thesis, Universidad de los Andes) (on file with author); Laura
Rico Gutinrrez de Pifieres, Jerusaldn: La Historia de un Barrio Contada por sus
Pobladores (June 30, 2006) (unpublished undergraduate thesis, Universidad de los
Andes) (on file with author); Nicolas Figueroa Garcia-Herreros, El Concepto de
Derecho en el Debate Sobre el Pluralismo Juridico (2006) (unpublished
undergraduate thesis, Universidad de los Andes) (on file with author).
3. UN HABITAT, PRO POOR LAND MANAGEMENT: INTEGRATING SLUMS INTO CITY
PLANNING APPROACHES 4-5 (2004), available at, www.chs.ubc.ca/archives/files/Pro%20
Poor%20Land%2OManagement.pdf.
4. In this article, I will interchangeably use the words "informal," "unofficial,"
and "extralegal" to name the non-state legal systems. These terms gather precisely
the fact that these "alternative" legal systems have a different origin from that of
state law and usually are in tension with it. This does not mean that informal legal
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with the State's legal system, or the conception of distinct theoret-
ical frameworks for considering the problem of property in devel-
oping countries.
On the other hand, legal monism flatly negates the possibility
of legal pluralism having normative value. In contrast with legal
monism, I will argue that the diversity of property regimes is, in
some cases, plausible from a regulatory point of view. Having a
plurality of systems regulating property would be an option that
could bear fruit in States consisting of communities that are radi-
cally diverse from a cultural point of view. This would be a mecha-
nism that would, among other things, contribute to the peace and
cohesion of the political community. In the same manner, the exis-
tence of "informal" or "unofficial" regimes that regulate property,
insofar as they are created directly by the citizens, would allow for
the adjustment of legal norms to the characteristic particularities
of each social group and for the quick and easy alteration of them
in accordance to changes that the groups experience. Likewise, it
would allow for the solution of cognitive problems faced by citizens
of low levels of education, economic resources, and social and polit-
ical connections, who usually have serious difficulties relating to
the state legal order.
To justify these arguments, I will divide this article in two
parts. In the first part, I will critically analyze the relationship
between legal monism and property. The reflection in this first
section, therefore, will be purely theoretical. In the second part
however, I will make a shift from theory to practice. In this section
I will describe and analyze the extralegal property regime that
determines the manner in which the inhabitants of the Jerusal6n
quarter, part of the Ciudad Bolivar district of Bogota, interpret
and transfer property. This case study will allow me to illustrate
the descriptive and normative shortcomings of legal monism, as
well as the usefulness of certain tools provided by legal pluralism
for comprehending the reality of property as it actually exists in
the Global South. Although the conclusions reached in this study
cannot be generalized, the notable similarities between the situa-
tion of the Jerusal6n inhabitants and that of the inhabitants in
peripheral quarters of the cities in the global South allow for the
articulation of some analogies that may help us to better under-
stand the property problem in this part of the world. At the end of
the second part, instead of concluding, I will try to bridge the gap
systems are less important than state law, less complex, or that they do not have a
clear or solid structure.
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between theory and practice. In these final reflections I will make
use of some of the theoretical tools studied in the first part of the
paper in order to comprehend the way by which the state legal
system interacts with the legal micro system, which governs in
Jerusal6n. Similarly, in these final remarks, I will offer some
reflections on the consequences that the coexistence of two prop-
erty regimes in the city should and do have.
II. LEGAL MONISM AND PROPERTY
Legal monists defend the idea that one and only one central-
ized hierarchical legal system exists and must exist in each
nation-state. Those who hold this theoretical perspective, there-
fore, are convinced that for each State one sole and indivisible sov-
ereign must (and generally does) exist. The power to make law is
concentrated in this sovereign and thus the sovereign is the sole
source of political power and guarantees the unity and cohesion of
the nation. The monists argue that the law created by the sover-
eign must consist in an assembly of general and abstract norms,
which reflect the dominant values in the community and must
form a stratified legal system. Thus, for the monist, the nation's
ethos is expressed in a legal order that contains as its basic compo-
nents rules and principles characterized by their universal and
eternal vocation and arranged in pyramidal fashion. The best ver-
sion of legal monism, as can be seen, is conceptually interwoven,
albeit not necessarily so, with liberalism.
The fact that liberal legal monism pervades our political and
legal imagination is not gratuitous. Its dominance rests on power-
ful theoretical and practical reasons. To begin with, monism
shores up its postulates by calling on principles that are highly
valued by the enlightened modern project to which an important
number of people today are committed, consciously or not. Liberal
legal monism calls on the principles of equality, legal security,
legality, and political unity to justify its postulates. For this ver-
sion of legal monism, the fundamental equality of human beings
must translate to the equality of citizenship. The political commu-
nity must therefore leave to one side the normative diversity char-
acteristic of estamental societies. Legal norms, in principle, must
be directed to all citizens and must govern the political community
for long periods of time. In this way, citizens will be able to form
accurate expectations regarding the legal consequences of their
actions and will be well aware of the areas unregulated by law
where they can fully and autonomously exert their will. Lastly,
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liberal legal monism guarantees the cohesion of the political com-
munity and creates the necessary conditions for collective action.
Secondly, legal monism offers practical advantages regarding
central themes to the life of any State that contrast with the dis-
advantages linked to the political organizations of the ancient
regime. The existence of a sole sovereign reduces the cognitive
costs tied to the determination of the norms that control a situa-
tion and therefore favors the obedience of law or the application of
sanctions in the case of disobedience. Likewise, having a single
stable system of norms applicable to all citizens contributes to the
creation of a strong and legitimate State. The citizens will identify
with a political community that recognizes them as equals. In con-
trast, the existence of multiple sovereigns, so characteristic of a
typical feudal system in the past regime, renders it difficult for the
citizen to easily and rapidly determine what norms they must
obey. The diversity of legal orders attempting to exert control over
actions contributes to the weakening and fragmentation of the
political community, and undermines the legitimacy of the State
when it extends basic rights differently to different groups of
citizens.
Liberal legal monism has been paradigmatically articulated
in the context of political philosophy by social contract theories,
particularly that of Locke.5 For adherents to social contract theory
in general, the fundamental reason for the move from the natural
state to a civil state is the existence of multiple legislators and
enforcers of the law, as well as the absence of an impartial third
party capable of resolving conflicts between people. For Locke in
particular, freedom in the natural state is perfect, not absolute,
inasmuch as the conduct of individuals is guided by natural law.
Conflict, however, is still inevitable in the natural state. Self-
interest and ignorance lead to violations of natural law, and inso-
far as all human beings are creations of divinity and, therefore
equal, there is no superior person capable of neutralizing the ten-
sions that arise among them.' All members of the species may act
as enforcers of natural law and judge the actions of others. The
issue is that in one situation, people may act out of egoism,
revenge, or confusion.' The creation of a political community then
5. Cf Lamprea, supra note 2.
6. See JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 262 (Special ed. 1994) (1698)
("Firft, There wants an eftablifh'd, fettled, known Law, received and allowed by
common content to be the Standard of Right and Wrong, and the common meafure to
decide all Controverfies between them.").
7. See id. at 174 ("Self-love will make Men partial to themfelves and their
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becomes necessary in order to "authoritatively" eliminate the mul-
tiplicity of legal operators and to resolve the problems to which
natural law's vagueness gives rise.8 The State, a consequence of
the consensus attained by people, must concentrate the creative
power of law and maintain a monopoly over force. In the same
way, the State must use both this power and this monopoly to pro-
tect the lives and property of all of its citizens, as well as to resolve
the disputes that occur among them.'
Within the confines of legal philosophy, it was Kelsen who
expressed liberal legal monism in its sharpest form. ° For Kelsen,
there is no difference between State and law: since the State is the
group of norms created by the sovereign, then, for this author,
both categories are identical. To be more precise, law, according to
Kelsen, is a hierarchical system constituted by norms enacted by a
set of centralized institutions whose validity is in turn derived
from a presupposed fundamental norm." According to Kelsen, the
law of the state excludes any other system of norms that poses
competition. If this were not the case, then the sovereign promot-
ing the law would not be supreme and therefore, would not be
Friends. And on the other fide, Ill Nature, Paffion and Revenge will carry them to far
in punifhing others. And hence nothing but Confufion and Diforder will follow, and
that therefore God hath certainly appointed Government to reftrain the partiality and
violence of Men.").
8. See id. at 267-68 ("This Legiflative is not only the fupream power of the
Common-wealth, but facred and unalterable in the hands where the Community have
once placed it; nor can any Edict of any Body elfe, in what Form foever conceived, or
by what Power foever backed, have the force and obligation of a Law, which has not
its Sanction from the Legisflative which the publick has chofen and appointed: For
without this the Law could not not have that which is abfolutely necessary to its being
a Law, the confent of the Society, over whom no Body can have a power to make Laws
but by their own confent, and by Authority received from them. ... ").
9. See id. at 238 ("Men being, as has been faid, by Nature, all free, equal and
independent, no one can be put out of his Eftate, and fubjected to the Political Power
of another, without his own Confent, which is done by agreeing with other Men to joyn
and unite into a Community, for their comfortable, fafe, and peaceable living one
amonsft another, in a fecure Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater Security
againft any that are not of it.").
10. Cf Lamprea, supra note 2.
11. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 221-22 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal.
Press 2d ed. 1967) ("The legal order is not a system of coordinated norms of equal
level, but a hierarchy of different levels of legal norms. Its unity is brought about by
the connection that results from the fact that the validity of a norm, created according
to another norm, rests on that other norm, whose creation in turn, is determined by a
third one. This is a regression that ultimately ends up in the presupposed basic norm.
This basic norm, therefore, is the highest reason for the validity of the norms, one
created in conformity with another, thus forming a legal order in its hierarchical
structure.").
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sovereign.12
Traditionally, private property and legal monism, expressed
in paradigmatic fashion by Locke and Kelsen, have gone hand in
hand. It is commonly held that private property could not exist in
the absence of one sole centralized hierarchical legal order at the
state level. Property, as the argument goes, would disappear in
the absence of a common property regime to furnish the categories
for understanding and transferring it and for resolving the con-
flicts that arise over it. The reasons that explain the close relation-
ship between these two categories are of a practical rather than
conceptual order. 3 Conceptually, it is not necessary to have a
property system at the state level for property rights to find exis-
tence, justification, and protection. For example, according to
Locke, property is a natural right, and its existence does not
depend on the existence of a State or on that of a unified norma-
tive system with a state-like character. 4
For legal pluralism, private property is also conceptually com-
patible with the existence of multiple property regimes within the
same State. Property rights do not conceptually depend on mon-
ism. The coexistence of two or more property regimes in the same
State can be justified by reasons which range from a respect for
cultural diversity to religious tolerance. 15 In fact, this is precisely
the situation encountered in an important number of contempo-
rary States: Colombia, Brazil, Haiti, the Philippines, and Egypt
for example. In these countries there are various coexisting prop-
erty regimes that demand obedience from the citizens, two of
12. HANS KELSEN, THE LAW AND THE STATE 189 (Anders Wedberg trans., Russell
& Russell 1961) ("It is the juristic concept of the State that sociologists apply when
they describe the relations of domination within the State. The properties they
ascribe to the State are conceivable only as properties of a normative order or of a
community constituted by such an order. Sociologists also consider an essential
quality of the State to be an authority superior to the individuals, obligating the
individuals. Only as a normative order can the State be an obligating authority,
especially if that authority is considered to be sovereign. Sovereignty is-as we shall
see later-conceivable only within the realm of the normative.").
13. Cf. Lamprea, supra note 2.
14. See LOCKE, supra note 6, at 185 ("Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures
be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Perfon. This noBody
has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we
may fay, are properly his. Whatfoever them he removes out of the State that Nature
hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with it, and joyned to it
fomething that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.").
15. See Ruth S. Meinzen-Dick & Rajendra Pradhan, Legal Pluralism and Dynamic
Property Rights 1-2, 26 (CGIAR Systemwide Program on Collective Action and
Property Rights, CAPRi Working Paper No. 22, 2002), available at http://ideas.repec.
org/p/fpr/worpps/22.html.
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which are the property systems of indigenous communities and
those that largely govern dealings in the peripheral districts of the
major cities.
To be sure, the first argument of a practical order that demon-
strates the plausibility of the nexus that has historically existed
between legal monism and property holds that the unity, clarity,
and simplicity that are guaranteed when there is only one state
property regime facilitate the decision-making process of the citi-
zens with respect to their goods and simplify community life. 6 The
existence of various property regimes in the same State would
then generate the opposite effects: it would make the system
unnecessarily complex and would force the citizen to obey a large
number of norms that often either contradict themselves or pro-
mote differing courses of action with respect to problems related to
property.
The second argument points out that legal monism of prop-
erty is necessary for the consolidation of a modern market econ-
omy. 7 There must be a common way of understanding,
evaluating, and transferring resources for the free interplay of
supply and demand to fluidly unfold. The circulation of property
becomes more difficult when there are competing forms of repre-
sentation, valorization, and exchange of property.
The third argument indicates that monism is necessary for
the social legitimacy of property rights."' The conflicts that gener-
ate the differences about property are tremendously divisive. Con-
sequently, these conflicts must be resolved rapidly, effectively,
and legitimately. Such a solution can only be reached if there is no
other recourse than to a single assembly of public norms accepted
by the majority of the citizens. These norms provide the substan-
tive and procedural tools to legitimately resolve the conflicts over
property. A single system of state regulation of property allows
citizens to fairly easily determine who owns what good and to
trust that their rights will be upheld in situations when they are
violated by third parties.
However, despite the strength of the practical arguments
16. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 43 (1990)
("Justification and legitimation necessarily proceed on a fairly broad; and the
organizing idea of a property system (the basis on which its rules are learned and
understood for application in everyday life) provides a natural point of contact
between legitimizing considerations and the grasp which ordinary citizens have on
the rules.").
17. See HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 7, 10 (2000).
18. WALDRON, supra note 16, at 162.
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called on to explain why legal monism of property does and should
exist; it is, at least in the global South, merely an aspiration.
Legal monism of property is not a fact in this region of the world. 9
At the most, it is an ideal, a hope, an illusion. Legal pluralism is
the rule, not the exception. In the global South, it is calculated
that by 2015 there will be around fifty cities with more than five
million inhabitants and the majority of these citizens will live in
informal settlements. ° Likewise, it is calculated that between
50% and 70% of the people in developing countries settle in infor-
mal sectors of cities. 1 In Egypt, extralegal property is currently
the rule for 92% of the people in cities and for 83% of those in rural
zones.22 In the Philippines, the norm is that 57% of city dwellers
and 67% of people in the countryside live in extralegal
settlements.
In Latin America, six of every eight buildings are constructed
outside the bounds of the official market economy and around 80%
of all real estate is beyond the orbit of state law. Other figures
indicate that between 40% and 50% of the populations of Latin
America and the Caribbean live in sectors that are unrecognized
by official law. Extralegal property in Bogotd reaches 59%, 10% in
Buenos Aires, 50% in Caracas, 40% in Lima, 40% in Mexico City,
50% in Quito, and 47% in Recife. 4 In Peru, only approximately 30
of every 100 houses built have a valid title recognized by the
State.25 Approximately 53% of the Peruvians who live in cities and
81% of those who live in rural areas dwell in lodgings which are
regulated by extralegal systems.26 In Haiti, the figures reach 68%
in the cities and 97% in the countryside.27 Furthermore, studies
carried out by CEPAL in Kingston, Lima, Managua, San Pedro
Sula, and Sao Paulo indicate that nearly half of the inhabitants in
those cities live in more or less precarious extralegal settlements
located in high-risk zones where the systems for the transfer of
19. Cf Lamprea, supra note 2.
20. DE SoTo, supra note 17, at 84.
21. Id. at 85.
22. Id. at 254.
23. Id. at 85.
24. Catalina Hinchey Trujillo, La Puesta en Prdctica de la Campaha de Seguridad
en la Tenencia de la Vivienda en Amdrica Latina y el Caribe, in LAS CAMPANAS
MUNDIALES DE SEGURIDAD EN LA TENENCIA DE LA VIVIENDA Y POR UNA MEJOR
GOBERNABILIDAD URBANA EN AMtRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE 25 (CEPAL, Seminar and
Conference Series, 2000).
25. DE SoTo, supra note 17, at 85.
26. Id. at 252.
27. Id. at 33.
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property and rent do not follow the mandates of the state's legal
system.2"
The problem is not necessarily that monism has failed to
materialize in the global South. Some may argue that the global
South has tried (and should always try) to make it a reality. The
problem is that legal monism does not admit that a high percent-
age of the population conceives of, evaluates, and transfers prop-
erty using norms that are distinct from those of state law. Legal
monism is a sort of conceptual lens that does not accurately
describe reality. On one hand, at least in Latin America, but per-
haps also in the rest of the Global South, it diverts the attention of
the authoritative legal operators. Legislators, judges, and admin-
istrators generally lose sight of the situation of the majority of citi-
zens with respect to property. Their discourse and actions only
address title and deed, the public registry, and the official real
estate market. The challenges and tensions over property are
resolved by public policy, laws, sentences, and decrees that find
their basis in categories and norms that have little to do with the
living conditions of a very high number of citizens. Without doubt,
public policies and legislative measures have been undertaken to
address the challenges of extralegal property in many Latin
American countries.2 9 These, however, are the exception; they are
responses caused by the sheer force of the facts on the ground-
that is, the immense social, economic, and political problems that
extralegal lodging generates.
On the other hand, an important number of Latin American
academics, and probably others in the global South, teach their
classes and write their books as if legal monism was the rule and
not the exception. Certainly, law students and practicing lawyers
need to know the official legal norms, but those are not the only
things that need to be known. It is more important for law profes-
sors to dedicate class time and pages in their books to themes such
as the ownership of wild animals, hunting, and fishing as forms of
occupation, accretion,30 and avulsion 31 than to subjects related to
28. See Trujillo, supra note 24.
29. Consider for example the legalization programs for marginal quarters and
individual titularization programs put forward by the People's Housing Bank in
Bogotd.
30. See C6digo Civil [COD. Crv.] art. 719 (Colom.) ("Accretion is the augmentation
of a riverbank or lake by the slow and unperceivable withdrawal of the waters.").
31. See C6digo Civil [COD. Civ.] art. 722 (Colom.) ("An owner conserves ownership
over the part of his land that, through movement or other violent natural force, is
transported from one location to another, to the effect of taking it back, but if it is not
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extralegal property. This theme is not even mentioned in the great
majority of course syllabi or books on property rights.32 Title and
deed are unavoidable subjects for any lawyer. It would seem, how-
ever, that extralegal regulatory systems of property should also be
unavoidable subjects for any lawyer.
Likewise, the dynamics that guide the interaction between
the official and informal property systems should be given impor-
tance. These systems are constantly colliding or complementing
each other. If attention were given to the relationship that these
assemblies of norms have, we would probably learn valuable les-
sons regarding, for example, the history of state law, the transfor-
mations that state law constantly undergoes due to contact with
informality and the relationships between law, politics, and
society.
Hence, if we want to understand the way in which property is
interpreted and exchanged in a large part of the Global South, we
must question the supposed unity, homogeneity, and exclusivity of
state property law. From an empirical perspective, state property
law coexists in much of the global South with extralegal systems
of property. Likewise, contact between these two groups of norms
generally results in the transformation of state law or through
incorporation of elements of extralegal systems into state law. It
would seem that state law and extralegal property systems are, in
many States in the global South, structurally paired;33 that is,
each sees the other as an external variable with which it interacts
and generates dynamics for the construction or recreation of its
internal structures. Both systems have entry and exit ports for
information that provide channels for intersystem communica-
tion. Both orders, sometimes willingly and sometimes in response
to powerful pressure from the other system, exchange information
which has internal effects. Neither system is sealed nor pure; in
other words, completely untainted by the other assembly of
norms.
So, then, if from the descriptive point of view legal monism for
property is questionable, what can be said of the model from a
normative point of view? Most theories on the informal sector in
general and on extralegal property in particular defend the idea
reclaimed within the following year, it becomes the property of the owner of the land
to which it was transported.").
32. See, e.g., Jost J. G6MEZ, BIENES (1981); IGNACIO ALHIPPIO G6MEZ, MANUAL DE
CIVIL BIENES Y DERECHOS REALES (1994); ARTURO VALENCIA ZEA, DERECHO CVL 2
(1990).
33. See Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus, supra note 2.
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that it should not have a place in modern society since it is a con-
sequence of the pre-capitalist remnants still found in the Global
South. According to both the theoreticians of modernization and
dependence and the Marxists and neoliberals, once capitalism is
consolidated in this region of the world or once it is subverted by a
communist system, extralegal property will vanish-as well it
should. The common argument that these theories share, despite
the important differences between them, is that this is the only
way to incorporate into the official system an assembly of citizens
who have historically remained on the margins of the political
community.
While for some this objective will only be reached if tradi-
tional systems of production that impede the implementation of a
modern market economy are displaced, for others it will only be
achieved if the gap is closed between the center and the internal
periphery, which does nothing other than reproduce the interna-
tional relationships of production. In the same way, for others
still, the disappearance of extralegal property systems will only
occur if the means of production are appropriated by the State.
These informal systems, it is argued, are one of the consequences
of the subordination that the capitalist system (whether it be con-
solidated or on the path to consolidation) forces upon large masses
of the population. Lastly, for certain others these alternative prop-
erty regimes will only be neutralized if the State takes measures
that allow for the absorption of "informal" goods into the formal
market economy. Massive programs of legalization of informal set-
tlements and ascription of individual deeds for the buildings, for
example, would be necessary to bring to life these resources which
remain on the margins of capitalism. All of these theories in the
end are ultimately intertwined with legal monism as it applies to
property.
Informal property systems are often doubtlessly the product
of unequal and unjust power relations, and maintain the people
who are subject to them in poverty and political marginalization.
Extralegal property rights are not recognized by the State and
thus do not enjoy the security of official rights. The coercive appa-
ratus of the State can never move to protect them, while on the
34. See Bob Jessop, Liberalism, Neoliberalism, and Urban Governance: A State-
Theoretical Perspective, 34 ANTIPODE 452 (2002); Alejandro Portes & Richard
Schauffler, Competing Perspectives on the Latin American Informal Sector, 19
POPULATION AND DEV. REV. 33 (1993); Tamar Diana Wilson, Introduction: Theoretical
Approaches to the Informal Sector, 25 LATIN AM. PERsp. 3 n.2 (1998).
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other side, it can always move to defend state property rights.
Extra-official property is always highly precarious. Similarly,
informal goods are outside the official market, and at times are
worth less than goods recognized by the State. 5 Many of these
goods, furthermore, cannot be used as collateral for bank loans
that could in turn be used to improve the quality of life of the own-
ers-for example, for improvements to the family's lodging or for
the creation or consolidation of small enterprises or businesses.
Lastly, since they are not recognized by the State, owners of infor-
mal goods often feel excluded from the political community-as if
they were second class citizens not worthy enough to participate
in the public sphere.
The problem with the dominant positions that look negatively
upon extralegal property is that they use these criticisms to dis-
qualify, a priori, any form of extralegal property. By definition, all
forms of extralegal property are dubious and must be fought. This
perspective obscures the fact that sometimes these property
regimes can have emancipating effects.3 1 Whether they are a prod-
uct of the absence of the State, of its authoritarianism, or are left
over from precapitalist times, the fact is that an important num-
ber of these systems once formed are not incapable of bringing
benefits to their creators and their creators do not always want to
be rid of them. Hypothetically, at least some of these regimes,
inasmuch as they were created from the bottom up, may ade-
quately reflect and protect the interests of those directly affected
by the informal system-a question which cannot always be predi-
cated on the state property regime. Likewise, at least some of
these systems are flexible, adaptable, and sensitive to context.
Some of these systems can keep pace with the changes that occur
in the areas where these systems are the rule.
These systems can also have egalitarian effects inasmuch as
they distribute the cognitive burden required by interaction with
the law. Identifying the norms that govern a case, interpreting
them, and interacting with the institution in charge of their
implementation are tasks which require the investment of notable
quantities of scarce resources: time, energy, and money among
others. These costs are usually very high for the habitants of zones
35. In some cities, the value of informal property is much higher than that of
formal property. See DE SOTO, supra note 17, at 189.
36. See DERECHO Y SOCIEDAD EN AMfRICA LATINA: UN DEBATE SOBRE LOS ESTUDIOS
JURfDICOS CRfTIcos 254-58 (M. G. Villegas & C. Rodriguez eds., 2003); Antonio Carlos
Wolkmer, Pluralismo Juridico: Nuevo Marco Emancipatorio en Amdrica Latina (on
file with the University of Miami Inter-American Law Review).
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where informal property systems exist, who are generally people
in the lowest socioeconomic categories of the community and have
limited education. The cognitive uncertainty with regards to law
is thus spread out more equitably: no one has a monopoly on tech-
nical legal knowledge and many more people can directly defend
their property rights. Lastly, the availability of various normative
regimes to regulate property can offer the necessary flexibility to
resolve parallel conflicts that arise in scenarios where the actors
are very diverse, such as in a complex situation where the State
faces a culturally distinct community disputing the use of water
for field irrigation and tensions arise between a member of the
majority community and a member of a minority group over how
much water each can use. The existence of diverse normative
orders could allow for a peaceful and legitimate resolution of
diverse conflicts for the people subject to their effects.
Similarly, monist visions of property lose sight of the fact that
informal regimes are sometimes the product of values and princi-
ples we are committed to; for example, the respect for cultural dif-
ference that led culturally diverse indigenous and black
communities in Colombia, Bolivia, and Mexico to create their own
property systems. In these cases it would seem desirable not only
to avoid measures whose aim is the destruction of these systems,
but also to develop programs that permit their protection and
reproduction.
So then the challenge of defining which unofficial property
systems should disappear and which should be protected cannot
be adequately met without empiric studies. Fieldwork seems una-
voidable in these cases. In order to evaluate the feasibility of the
system, knowing its history, its content, and the consequences it
has for its creators and for third parties, as well as knowing the
position that these persons take in regards to the continuation or
disappearance of the system, are all necessary.
III. JERUSALAN, CIUDAD BOLIVAR, BOGOTA: LEGAL
PLURALISM AND INFORMAL PROPERTY
The team that worked for six months in the Jerusal~n quarter
of Ciudad Bolivar consisted of five persons: two law professors, an
anthropologist, and two law students. 7 This quarter was chosen
for the case study for three fundamental reasons: first, because
37. Everaldo Lamprea, Daniel Bonilla, Francisco Quiroz, Laura Rico, and Nicol.s
Figueroa respectively.
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Jerusaldn is one of the quarters with the highest number of build-
ings lacking titles in Ciudad Bolivar; it is also one of the quarters
where the People's Housing Bank (la Caja de Vivienda Popular),
the entity handling housing matters for people of limited economic
resources in Bogota, has put forward massive programs to assign
titles for buildings. Secondly, it was chosen because it was a quar-
ter in which it was possible to gain access via researchers from the
Universidad de los Andes who had previously worked in the zone.
Establishing a fluent relationship with the inhabitants of Ciudad
Bolivar, there or in any other neighborhood in the city, is not an
easy task if the initial contact is not made through consolidated
and reliable channels of communication, especially when the
object of study pertains to real estate that has not been officially
recognized by the State. Thirdly, it was chosen because it is one of
the few quarters of Ciudad Bolivar of which something has been
written.3" Although no research with a similar theoretical frame-
work and goal to ours had been done, we would have some basic
information about the neighborhood. Thus, we would not have to
begin our research completely in the dark.
The case study was guided by three general questions: Does
an informal property regime exist in Jerusal~n? If so, what are the
characteristics of the system? Finally, once the system had been
mapped, what could be said of the normative value of this infor-
mal property system? To respond to these lines of questioning, the
research took an informed qualitative and theoretical focus. 9 The
objective of the research was to accurately identify the internal
point of view of practicing members of the quarter; that is, to
describe how the inhabitants of Jerusal6n understood questions of
property in the quarter. We meant to privilege the notions, intu-
itions, categories, and representations of the people directly impli-
cated in the property dynamics in the area rather than, as is
common in this kind of work, the descriptions that researchers
might make from the "outside looking in."
To achieve this objective, a combination of three methodolo-
38. See M. C. Niio & J. CHAPARRO, USOS, COSTUMBRES E IMAGINARIOS EN EL
EsPAcIo PIfBLICO: EL SECTOR JERUSAL9N (1998); MARIA MERCEDES MALDONADO, EL
SIGNIFICADO JURfDICO DEL "DERECHO A LA CIUDAD" (2002); REPORT GIVEN AT LINCOLN
INSTITUTE FOR LAND POLICY, CURSO DE DESARROLLO PROFESIONAL, MERCADOS
INFORMALES: REGuLARIZACION DE LA TENENCIA DE TIERRA Y PROGRAMAS DE
MEJORAMIENTO URBANO EN AMI9RICA LATINA (Nov. 18-22, 2002).
39. See Paul Willis & Mats Trondman, Manifesto for Ethnography, 1
ETHNOGRAPHY 5 (2000).
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gies were used: observation, life stories,4 ° and semi-structured
interviews. 41 All in all, thirty nine interviews were conducted;
thirty four of the interviewees were inhabitants of Jerusal6n and
five were public officials directly involved in the property regulari-
zation programs in the quarter. The number of interviews was
determined by the saturation of information criterion .42 The inter-
views were discontinued when it was seen that the response pat-
terns of the interviewees were repeating themselves.
The research was theoretically informed inasmuch as a theo-
retical framework was established, that of legal pluralism, which
was used to determine in a precise way the object of study, as well
as to define an assembly of problems and questions to guide the
fieldwork. As is required by this type of perspective however, the
relationship between theory and practice was not limited to one
direction alone. The fieldwork contributed to question, confirm
and develop certain conceptual categories advanced by legal plu-
ralism. It is best to avoid two extremes in theoretically informed
research: on the one hand, that the theory becomes an end in and
of itself, and on the other, that the fieldwork is initiated without
clear and precise conceptual tools.44
Legal pluralism, the framework within which the research
was carried out, advances two fundamental theses: first, that it is
an error to identify rights with state law and that the center of
gravity in law is not the State, but the society. For legal pluralism,
it is not unusual at all for two or more legal orders to coexist in
one State. Yet, for legal pluralism it is fundamental to distinguish
two phenomena that can be easily confused: internally diverse
legal systems (for example, a federalist system) and a plurality of
systems coexisting within a State. 45 The first phenomenon is a
variation of legal monism. In this type of situations there is a sole
rule of recognition that is internally diverse. This legal system
40. See Daniel Bonilla, Pluralismo Juridico y Propiedad Extralegal: Clase,
Cultura y Derecho en Bogotd, 36 REVISTA DERECHO PRJVADO 207 (Colom. 2006).
41. Francisco Quiroz, La Propiedad Extralegal en Jerusal6n: Estudio de Caso
(unpublished research report, on file with the author).
42. See Daniel Bertaux, From the Life-History Approach to the Transformation of
Sociological Practice, in BIOGRAPHY AND SOCIETY: THE LIFE HISTORY APPROACH IN THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 29, 37 (Daniel Bertaux ed., 2d prtg. 1983).
43. See generally MARTYN HAMMERSLEY & PAUL ATKINSON, ETHNOGRAPHY:
PRINCIPLES IN PRACTICE 23-53 (2d ed., Routledge 1995) (1983); ROSANA GUBER, LA
ETNOGRAFIA, MIETODO, CAMPO Y REFLEXIVIDAD (2001).
44. Quiroz, supra note 41.
45. See Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who's Afraid of Legal Pluralism?, 47 J.
LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 37, 63 (2002).
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therefore can be adequately synthesized by the image of the kel-
senian pyramid; no doubt a complex pyramid, but only one pyra-
mid. The second phenomenon, plurality of systems, is legal
pluralism's true object of study. In this situation, persons face the
coexistence of at least two different legal systems within the same
political unit. Each of these legal systems has its own rule of rec-
ognition, and thus, autonomy.
This is to say that pluralism directly targets legal monism as
its adversary. Nevertheless, legal pluralism is not a current of
monolithic thought.46 The three most important variations within
this theoretical perspective are Classical Legal Pluralism
("CLP"), v New Legal Pluralism ("NLP"), 8 and Conventionalism.49
The research in Jerusal~n was guided by the postulates of
Conventionalism. For a conventionalist, the object of study of
CLP, that is, the epistemological space created by colonial and
postcolonial relationships, is tremendously limited. It is not clear
why the plurality of legal orders is a monopoly of colonial territo-
ries, both conceptual and physical. Legal pluralism seems to be
part of the reality in most contemporary States and not all legal
pluralism in colonies or ex-colonies can be explained starting with
the relationship of these places with the metropolis, extralegal
property being one example. Likewise, it seems that the concep-
tion of imperial law and subordinate law as separate, autono-
mous, and closed systems turns out to be questionable. It would
seem that these, as do many legal systems that coexist in the
same State, usually enter into a dialogue that not only transforms
each, but also converts them into systems that mutually incorpo-
rate parts of the other.
NLP attempted to neutralize several of the weaknesses of
CLP. It pointed out that plurality of legal systems is a characteris-
46. Daniel Bonilla Maldonado & Libardo Ariza Higuera, El Pluralismo Juridico:
Contribuciones, Debilidades y Retos de un Concepto Poldmico, in PLURALISMO
JURfDICO 19 (Sally Engle Merry et al. eds., 2007).
47. Leopold Pospisil, Kapauku Papuans and their Law, 54 YALE U. PUBLICATIONS
IN ANTHROPOLOGY 3 (1958); Leopold Pospisil, Legally Induced Culture Change in New
Guinea, in THE IMPOSITION OF LAW 127 (Sandra B. Burman & Barbara E. Harrell-
Bond eds., 1979).
48. See Blomley, supra note 2, at 91 n.2; Merry, supra note 2; Boaventure de Sousa
Santos, The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction and Reproduction of Legality in
Pasargada, 12 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 5, 5 (1977); Wilson, supra note 2, at 3 n.2. See
generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 2; Griffiths, supra note 2; Teubner, The Two Faces of
Janus, supra note 2; Teubner, Breaking Frames, supra note 2.
49. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 166-
70 (2001); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Folly of the 'Social Scientific' Concept of Legal
Pluralism, 20 J. L. & Soc'Y 192, 192 n.2 (1993).
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tic in a number of industrialized and postindustrial States. Like-
wise, it argued that within the colonial context not every
pluralism is a result of the relations between a metropolis and its
"overseas territories." The new legal pluralists pushed forward
with research to locate and describe legal orders that govern,
among other things, companies, international organizations, uni-
versities, mafias, and marginal communities. Lastly, the NLP
stressed the intertwined and overlapping character of many of the
legal orders that coexist within the same State. For the conven-
tionalists, however, NLP still has a fundamental flaw: the vague
character of its concept of law that does not allow it to distinguish
between the realms of the legal and the social. For NLP, every
normative order can be qualified as a legal order. The category of
"law" thus loses its analytic power, and the connections and differ-
ences between legal orders and other normative orders are
obscured.
Conventionalism deals with the conceptual ambiguity of the
concept of law by concentrating on the discursive practices of peo-
ple."° For a conventionalist, laws are what people define them to
be in their social practices, so research into legal pluralism should
concentrate on how people use the term "law" and the courses of
action that these uses lead to. Likewise, this argumentative
maneuver avoids falling into the essentialism or functionalism of
the perspectives that attempt to articulate a sharper concept of
law by starting from a characteristic or a group of characteristics
that are supposedly ever present in a legal system, or by starting
from a function or group of functions that law supposedly always
performs. The term "law" for a conventionalist names very diverse
realities that do not necessarily have elements in common. For
this reason it was fundamental to concentrate the research in
Jerusal~n on the internal point of view of its inhabitants.
IV. THE SYSTEM FOR REGULATING PROPERTY IN
JERUSALtN, CIUDAD BOLVAR, AND ITS INTERACTION
WITH OFFICIAL LAW
Ciudad Bolivar is urban district number nineteen in Bogotd
and is located in the southwest part of the city." The district
counts 658,477 inhabitants, 12,998 hectares (50.2 sq. miles), and
50. See TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 49, at 166, 171-205.
51. See ALCALDIA MAYOR DE BOGOTA ET AL., RECORRIENDO UsME: DIAGNOSTICO
FfSICO Y SOCIOECONOMICO DE LAS LOCALIDADES DE BOGOTA, D.C. (2004).
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252 quarters. In terms of population it ranks fourth in the city and
its inhabitants represent approximately 10% of the population of
the Capital District. In surface area, the district is only super-
seded by two other districts, Sumapaz and Usme, and it is one of
the zones of the city with the most marginal neighborhoods, that
is, developments without any official planning or recognition or
basic public services. By 2002, the Capital District had legalized
146 of these quarters, which represents 1,176 hectares and 63,051
lots; making it the district in Bogotd with the most legalized lots.
Ciudad Bolivar is one of the poorest districts of the city. It has
the highest poverty and misery indexes of the twenty districts in
the Capital District. 26.3% of the displaced people who migrate to
Bogotd come to Ciudad Bolivar. In the area there are 97,477 peo-
ple whose basic needs are not satisfied. This number represents
the highest percentage of people living in these circumstances
with respect to the total number of inhabitants per district. While
the overall proportion for Bogotd is 7.8%, in Ciudad Bolivar it is
16.2%. According to figures from District Planning Department,
59.7% of this district's inhabitants are in Category 1 and 35.7%
are in Category 2 (the lowest categories in the official classifica-
tion), which means 95% of the population live in poverty
conditions.
Jerusal~n is one of the 252 quarters of Ciudad Bolivar and
one of 146 quarters that have been legalized by the Capital Dis-
trict. Its population is approximately 32,000 inhabitants, and a
density of 67.82 people per hectare. The majority of its inhabitants
come from zones other than the Capital District and are in the
socioeconomic level one, the lowest in the state classification sys-
tem. Its inhabitants, as is the rule in Ciudad Bolivar, are mostly
country dwellers who came to the area after having been displaced
by the armed conflict that has lasted for more than forty years or
who came to Bogotd in search of economic opportunities for their
families. A notable percentage of them come from the departments
of Santander, North Santander, Tolima, and BoyacA.52 The quar-
ter is divided into approximately 8,597 lots, most of which do not
have public deeds. The case study thus focused on one of the
poorest, most populated zones with the highest number of
problems regarding informality in all of Bogotd.
The interviews and observations carried out by the research
team in Jerusal~n enabled us to respond affirmatively to the first
52. Nifio & Chaparro, supra note 38, at 166.
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question guiding the study. In effect, the residents of Jerusal6n
consider that property in their neighborhood is conceived, evalu-
ated, and transferred by means of a legal system distinct from
that of the state. State law governs "out there." In the quarter
itself, an assembly of alternative norms reigned. As Carmen Fer-
nandez, one of the local leaders, put it: "there is our law, and then
there is state law."53 This system, argued the residents who were
interviewed, has its origin in the void left by the State and the
urgent need for access to housing "rights," as well as the subse-
quent need to price and transfer lots and houses. This system also
arises as a consequence of the informal origin of the quarter itself.
Jerusal.n was built on lands that were part of Hacienda Casa-
blanca, which belonged to a prominent family in Bogota. It was
built on lots sold by a group of people-"Los Socios" (the Associ-
ates)-who parceled the land unbeknownst to its owners and
offered it for sale to people of low economic resources interested in
becoming "landowners." Some of the people who arrived in the
quarter in 1981, when it was just beginning, were aware of the
fact that they were buying lots that belonged to someone else;
others knew they were taking part in transactions that were "ille-
gal" from an official, legal point of view.
The fieldwork also showed us that the informal legal property
order in Jerusal6n was structured around six rules and one princi-
ple, that have governed the lives of the inhabitants of the quarter
for close to twenty-five years and that are still perceived by the
inhabitants in contrast to the official laws. 4
The first central rule in the "Jerusal~n" legal order estab-
lishes the criterion for determining who can be considered an
owner in the quarter. This first rule indicates that ownership is
conferred to those who build on the land.5 This is to say that prop-
53. Interview with Carmen Fernindez in Jerusal~n Quarter, Ciudad Bolivar,
Bogotd, Colombia (Mar. 11, 2008).
54. "Let's say that I have a lawyer's instincts. So I see the problems. I told my
partner, 'you gave him ten thousand pesos, so what? I need to see the title.' If this is so
cheap I need a title. At the time I didn't know anything about what possession was or
what a title was or anything. I only knew that there were titles and that the man who
sold us the land had obviously not given us a title, he gave us a promise of sale. But
I'm not like the old folks, for me a promise of sale isn't good for anything. We had a lot
of altercations, my partner and I, over the famous purchase agreement. I was fully
aware that at any time the police could kick us out and we would be right back where
we were before, renters in the big city." Id.
55. "For us, as leaders, I don't speak for anyone, first of all because we weren't
going to give away the ownership rights we earned over 20 years to the Gavirias or to
anyone. I recognize the ownership rights of my neighbor, the one over here, the one
over there, the President of Bellavista, the President of Potosi, the gentleman with
232
LEGAL MONISM AND PLURALISM
erty in Jerusal6n is acquired through the transformation of the
land by work, particularly work that results in the construction of
real estate. The Colombian Civil Code and its rules of title and
deed are not used as a reference in determining property owner-
ship in Jerusal~n. It is interesting to examine the similarities of
this practice with the argument advanced by Locke to determine
who can be considered the owner of a good-namely, he or she
that has transformed the good with work." For the inhabitants of
Jerusal~n, this is a rule that commands deep respect and strikes
powerful emotions given the difficulties and efforts that were nec-
essary to build and consolidate the quarter. This rule is also used
as evidence of ownership within the quarter and as evidence of
possession for the official law, for example when people partici-
pate in the programs that the municipality of Bogotd has devel-
oped to assign titles to informal dwellings.
The second rule refers to the way by which property is trans-
ferred in the quarter. Jerusal~n's inhabitants resort to an institu-
tion called the promise of sale. 7 This is an informal document
which identifies the buyer, seller, price and the lot under negotia-
tion. Consequently, the promise of sale is the principal means of
proving ownership within the settlement. In some occasions this
document is notarized by a public notary by the buyers and sell-
ers. In the eyes of state law, however, this written agreement has
no validity as proof of ownership, nor has it anything to do with
the institution recognized by the civil code that carries the same
name. An official promise of sale is a document that requires the
the freight, the one with the scrap yard, the one who loads the peddler's cart; these
are the owners .... Here we say that we don't recognize any other owner of this land
than ourselves. We've made it better, we've suffered, we've felt hunger, we've created
an entire model or history of an organized community and that is enough." Interview
with Ruben Darfo Silva in Jerusal6n Quarter, Ciudad Bolivar, Bogotd, Colombia
(June 2005).
56. See LocKE, supra note 6.
57. "The promise of sale was, and still is today, like an IOU. You know what an
IOU is? An IOU says: in the name of so-and-so I owe so much money at so much
interest at payments over so much time. A promise of sale is the same: a title in which
the person is certifying that the land which at this time I am ceding to the gentleman
is really mine and I cede it to the gentleman for a certain price from a certain date on.
Then comes the signature with the number of the lot and all. Some of these promises
are made out well in receipts, those preprinted receipts where it's explained that the
lot is located in whatever block next whosever's lot. Then we took it to the notary and
the notary authenticated the signatures. That was when you could say 'this is mine.'
Other promises of sale were sloppy, some were even done on notebook paper. But
whatever, all this was done, it was all valid, because here we put a lot of faith in a
person's word." Interview with Carmen Ferndndez in Jerusal6n Quarter, Ciudad
Bolivar, Bogotd, Colombia (Mar. 11, 2008).
20091 233
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2
different parties to sign a purchase agreement by a specified time
in the future. The transfer of property ownership in Jerusal~n is
by no means carried out in accordance with official procedures.
The third rule, which disappeared once the quarter was con-
solidated, was the means by which the inhabitants sought to
establish a public registry of the lots. The "Jerusal~n" order
required that every lot in the quarter be registered in the Building
Log.58 This log was created by the Communal Action Assembly, a
type of community organization that is very well-known in Colom-
bia and is also recognized and promoted by state law. This build-
ing log serves three very important functions: to resolve conflicts
between those who dispute ownership of the same lot (some lots
were repeatedly sold by "Los Socios"), to maintain order in the
community, and to provide a method for proving ownership within
the quarter. The Building Log constituted a public instrument for
guaranteeing the legitimacy of property rights in the settlement.
The fourth, fifth, and sixth rules are directly related to the
means for proving property rights in the quarter and for protect-
ing the right that state law could grant to the residents of
Jerusal6n: possession. These rules establish, respectively, that
ownership can be proven through extrajudicial testimony,59
through the testimony of neighbors, ° or through the payment
receipts for residential public services or property taxes collected
by the city."1 The rule that refers to extrajudicial testimony gives
58. "And then, with the Pre-Assembly and the Assembly, these issues started
being resolved in a different way; they were resolved with the building log that was
made. In this log, all the buildings were written down, organized into blocks where
every lot had a number. We all went there to register our lot, they marked it with a
pen and they kept a little list with the names of all the owners, so it was known that
the owner of such and such a lot was so-and-so." Id.
59. "[Tlhe Assembly had to certify that someone really was the owner and that
they weren't taking over or taking away from some other poor guy. So we validated
possession of the properties. The Housing Bank resisted this ... legal department.
They told us we had to have some document. They kept saying: you have to have this
document and you have to have that document. Well we told them no we didn't. We
said we were making our own document, and that was when we started with
extrajudicial testimony. You can't say you're not the owner of something because you
lost the document! No! No! There has to be a way to solve the problem." Id.
60. "I tell the buyer, 'I'll sell you this building but I need a promise of sale,' and if
it's necessary some witnesses come, even neighbors, to prove that what is being sold
belongs to the seller; or it can be checked with the Communal Action Assembly
because it is written there in the book where they logged everything [sic]." Interview
with Lucy Estela L6pez in Jerusal6n Quarter, Ciudad Bolivar, Bogotd, Colombia (May
2008).
61. "What was the most basic documentation requirement? Proving that you had
lived in possession of the land for five years. How to prove it? With your purchase
agreement, with receipts for public services; then we said: 'as we're starting in 2003,
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internal value to one of the institutions of state law. It is a decla-
ration made before a judge of state law which affirms that an indi-
vidual has been in possession of a lot for a determined amount of
time. This is also a proof mechanism for property "inside the quar-
ter" and of possession "outside the quarter." It is a paradigmatic
example of what we could call a hinge institution, that is, an insti-
tution that connects both systems and which produces effects in
both orders-however distinct the consequences it leads to in each
are.
The testimony of neighbors and the payment receipts for
taxes and public services are also used as proof mechanisms both
internally and externally. The first recognizes that those who can
testify in good faith on ownership are those who have been a part
of the processes of creation and consolidation of the quarter and
who have shared the burden of building housing and the common
areas of the settlements. The second makes use of an instrument
created by the state as a means of proof in its internal system of
who holds ownership and as proof in the external system of who
has possession. Paradoxically, Jerusal~n's inhabitants, although
not recognized as owners by state law, receive a notice each year
indicating the amount of property tax they owe to the city. Like-
wise, they receive invoices on a monthly or bimonthly basis from
state companies indicating the amounts that they must pay for
the use of water and electric energy.
Lastly, the principle that regulates all real estate transac-
tions in Jerusal~n is trust. The contracting parties' word plays a
fundamental role in transactions of this type. On one hand, the
community in question is relatively small, so the majority of its
members know each other. On the other, there is no institution
capable of guaranteeing the fulfillment of the contracted require-
ments. In the end, it is a community that was and still is
(although much less so these days) influenced by the very values
of the Colombian countryside where one's word of honor has great
importance for people. 2
bring receipts from the past five years, so those starting in 97 and 98,' but I threw all
those out, I don't have them,' 'go to the companies and ask for new ones.'" Interview
with Ruben Dario Silva in Jerusaldn Quarter, Ciudad Bolivar, BogotA, Colombia
(June 2005).
62. "If one guy was the owner, and we saw someone else making a move on the lot,
then we had to find out about the documentation he had and then we notified the first
person who claimed it. It was really a matter of trust. If you said, 'this lot is mine and
I have this document,' then we trusted that it really was his, in good faith we told
him, 'sure, all right, this lot is yours.'" Id.
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In sum, we can say that the legal system of Jerusal6n has the
following characteristics: first, it is a system that was built from
the bottom up out of the necessity of the residents for lodging and
of the complete absence of the State in the area; second, it is a
short and simple legal order. It is composed of a low number of
rules, principles, and institutions, which are easily understood,
interpreted, and applied by everyone involved; third, it is a system
that does not presuppose a large investment of economic
resources. The system does not require its subjects to invest nota-
ble sums of money in order to mobilize it; fourth, it is a flexible
system, which has the capacity to adapt to the changing circum-
stances of the quarter. Once the settlement was consolidated, for
example, the Building Log lost its importance as a means of prov-
ing ownership, while the payment receipts for taxes became fun-
damental for this purpose; fifth, the order is not considered by its
creators as an end in itself and the end that it serves is no other
than the guarantee for the protection and transfer of real estate
within the quarter. In other cases the code could be a means to
reproduce a valued traditional culture.
Sixth, the "Jerusal6n" order is partly a product of the material
and symbolic interaction with the state system. The basic concepts
used by the legal operators in this quarter of Ciudad Bolivar, such
as property, possession, and promise of sale, are taken from state
law, although they are obviously reinterpreted and transformed to
suit the context in which they are applied. Similarly, the property
system of Jerusal6n appropriates institutions of state law, such as
notaries, judges, and communal action assemblies, for use in the
quarter. The notaries are used to "legalize" the documents that
transfer property, the judges as a means of proof of ownership in
the quarter, and the Communal Action Assemblies as institutions
that legitimately solve problems surrounding real estate in the
area. This appropriation however, is not one-sided. State law is
also experiencing the effects of the informal system of Jerusal~n.
The legalization of the quarter, the construction of public spaces
and of networks for the supply of residential public services, as
well as the collection of fees for these services and the property
taxes, are a consequence of the interaction of state law with the
legal order of Jersal~n and the powerful social, economic, and
political circumstances that led to its creation.
Once the basic characteristics of the Jerusal~n legal order are
identified, what can be said of its normative value? Should the
permanence and propagation of this system be promoted? The
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data collected in the fieldwork pointed to two fundamental factors
that enable us to provide a good answer to the question (that is, a
response that rests its justification on good reasons). On one hand,
the quarter's inhabitants created the legal system because there
was no other option for regulating the transmission of property-
the "illegality" of the buildings, the absence of the State, and the
need to gain access and exercise the "right to the city" did not
leave them any other option. From the point of view of the inhabi-
tants and the investigators on the research team, there is no value
protected by the "Jerusal6n" order that could not be preserved as
well or better by state law. On the other hand, the residents of
Jerusal6n believe that the system should be abandoned. From
their perspective, the assimilation of the system by state law has
important advantages: higher security for property rights,
unquestionable intergenerational transmission, access to the offi-
cial market economy, and much less psychological stress.
That the informal laws should be abandoned in this case does
not mean that state law should be transformed to effect such a
change. State law should reduce the cognitive and economic costs
and obstacles to access that the inhabitants of Jerusal6n must
bear in understanding, interpreting, and applying the official
norms. For reasons of principle and for strategic reasons as well,
the State should make every effort possible to reach this goal. On
one hand, it is the State's duty to assure equal access to rights for
63. "Obviously there are other advantages to following the procedure for
ownership [which lead to obtaining a public title]. One is pride, yes, pride. Because
one shouldn't have to beg for what is theirs. There are other benefits, clearly: being
sure that the land is mine, that one sunny day someone won't show up with a promise
of sale saying 'this isn't mine.' Because that still happens here. After ten or fifteen
years, someone shows up saying, 'Oh no, what a shame, look at this, I have a promise
of sale that predates yours.' Another reason has to do with family problems. If I live
with my partner, or with my spouse, or with my brother or with my uncle or with my
grandfather, we all share the same possession. Or is it that the one who came 20
years ago and said to his sister, come and take care of this for me, could he then be the
owner? The sister who sacrificed herself for 20 years taking care of the plot or he who
came and paid five thousand pesos, or ten thousand, or thirty thousand, or a hundred
thousand to buy it and then abandoned it? So it's also about looking for security for
the people who lived here 20 years and who can't be sure that the ground they live on
is theirs. A title is also useful for the matter of, let's say, those who like to keep their
things up to date, isn't it? It's that it's preferable to have things legalized. Like in this
one case: someone has a warrant out on them, a criminal record, everything up to
date; well the same should be true of housing, shouldn't it? This is the fundamental
vision to start the ownership process. Obviously, there are added benefits: if I have a
title, it's easier to get credit, it's easier to get a mortgage, it's easier for me to, I don't
know, easier for me to get recognized as an owner." Interview with Carmen
Ferndndez in Jerusal6n Quarter, Ciudad Bolivar, Bogota, Colombia (Mar. 11, 2008).
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every citizen, and on the other, if the goal is not reached, the
inhabitants of Jerusal~n will simply recreate their own system of
norms. It is important to emphasize the fact that the need to
abandon the informal order of the quarter does not mean that all
analogous orders must also be abandoned; there may be good rea-
sons justifying the preservation of these other legal systems. This
decision can only be taken after carrying out empirical studies to
furnish the necessary information for such a decision.
To conclude, it is fundamental to point out that legal monism
is not capable of describing the reality of the property system in
Jerusal6n, nor does it adequately describe the reality of property
rights for a good part of the people living in the global South. For
monism, legal pluralism is an exception, which either does not
warrant attention or only merits consideration of means to eradi-
cate it. This matters because, if our legal and political imagination
continues to be dominated by monism (and if we continue to
ignore the strengths of certain categories of legal pluralism), we
will not be able to understand our reality well enough to make
informed decisions regarding its normative value or be able to rec-
ognize and evaluate the efforts of the people who create and
recreate it daily.
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